Robert L. Ostergard, Jr.

Ostergard demonstrates that the expansion of international property rights protection in developing countries results from a response to external political pressure and not from a concern for economic growth.

Ostergard argues that developing nations adopt stronger intellectual property rights protection in response to international pressures and not as a basis for economic growth and development. Using a new methodology for the measurement of intellectual property rights protection, Ostergard presents empirical evidence to show that, as developing nations become more integrated into the international economic system, they are faced with greater external pressures to increase intellectual property rights protection. Hence, their decision to adopt stronger intellectual property rights protection is purely political. This runs counter to Western arguments for intellectual property rights based on the assumption that stronger intellectual property rights promote economic growth and development.

Table of Contents

Introduction
1. Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right
2. The Political and Economic Determinants of Intellectual Property Rights Protection
3. Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis
4. United States: Intellectual Property Rights Policy in a Changing World Order
5. ChinaÕs Emerging Markets: Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Politics of Development
6. Nigeria: The Politics of Industrial Stagnation
7. Conclusion
   References
   Index